simpler check and deps messages

rig/ctrl/registry.sh

@@ -1,28 +1,8 @@
 #!/usr/bin/env bash
-# Registry plumbing. THIS is the seam — not a tool.
-#
-# Four modes, selected by REGISTRY_MODE in the active profile:
-#
-#   none     Tilt builds straight into the node. No registry at all — and so no
-#            guard against an outward push: an unqualified image name means
-#            docker.io/library/<name>, and only Tilt's kind detection stands
-#            between that and a real push. Throwaway use only; every profile
-#            here now defaults to `local` instead.
-#   local    a registry:2 container wired into the cluster.
-#   mirror   the same container, but configured as a pull-through CACHE of the
-#            corporate registry. What a locked-down client actually looks like:
-#            images originate from corp, you don't hammer it, and you keep
-#            working when the VPN drops.
-#   remote   no local container; pull straight from the corporate registry using
-#            an imagePullSecret.
-#
-# Deliberately a script rather than a tool. ctlptl collapses the `local` wiring
-# into one line, but its Registry spec only accepts name/port/image/listenAddress
-# — there is no way to set REGISTRY_PROXY_REMOTEURL, so it cannot express
-# `mirror` at all. Keeping the seam here is what keeps the corporate registry
-# swappable.
-#
+# Registry plumbing: REGISTRY_MODE none | local | mirror | remote. A script, not ctlptl,
+# because ctlptl cannot express `mirror`.
 # Usage: registry.sh up | down | status
+# Notes: docs/notes/registry.md
 set -euo pipefail
 cd "$(dirname "$0")"
 
@@ -34,17 +14,7 @@ REG_PORT="${REGISTRY_PORT:-5005}"
 K="kubectl --context ${KUBECONTEXT}"
 
 # ── CA trust ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
-# A corporate registry is almost always fronted by an internal CA, and trust has
-# to reach three separate places. Nothing does this for you, and the symptom when
-# it's missing is an opaque:
-#   x509: certificate signed by unknown authority
-#
-#   1. the host docker daemon   — /etc/docker/certs.d/<host>/ca.crt (needs root)
-#   2. every kind node's containerd — nodes do NOT inherit host trust
-#   3. anything doing HTTPS from inside the cluster, in its own trust store
-#
-# We handle (2) here because it's ours to handle. (1) is reported by check.sh
-# since it needs root. (3) belongs to the workload.
+# Copy REGISTRY_CA_FILE into every kind node's trust store (nodes don't inherit host trust).
 install_ca_into_nodes() {
     [ -n "${REGISTRY_CA_FILE:-}" ] || return 0